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Abstract: In most countries, groundwater resource is a public good, and the entitlement of 
use rights by the public authority to final users differs according to a country-specific 
legislative framework. In Italy, groundwater extraction has been regulated through  
non-tradable private licenses. At present, the public authority needs to reform the current 
legislative framework, in order to comply with the Water Framework Directive, aimed at 
the enhancement of the efficiency of the resource use. This research analyzes the effects of 
reforming the current framework based on non-tradable use rights, by comparing two 
different liberalization scenarios: an intra-sector market, and a regional market. Although 
positive economic benefits are generally expected from the liberalization of use rights at 
aggregated level, we want to analyze whether effects of the legislative framework causes 
uneven changes on some farm groups. The empirical case study refers to the Fortore river 
basin (South of Italy), where groundwater covers about 50–80% of current needs, and 
informal (though illegal) water markets across neighbor farmers already exist. From the 
findings, there is no evidence that the exchange liberalization of groundwater use rights 
leads to gains in terms of the value added and the farmer’s revenue. In addition, in the case 
of an auction system regulated by the public authority, farmers whose water productivity is 
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higher may be able to gain, while others may suffer some losses. In this case, resistances 
from farmers’ associations towards the legislative framework reform may arise. 
Keywords: water markets; groundwater; Water Framework Directive; economic assessment 
 
1. Introduction 
Groundwater is a strategic resource for satisfying current water needs. According to some estimates 
across the world, groundwater is the major source of potable water in industrialized countries, such as 
in Europe (75%) or in the US (51%). In addition, it is also very important in other continents, such as 
Asia-Pacific (32%), Latin America (29%), and Australia (15%) [1]. At the European level, the share of 
groundwater to water supply largely varies across countries, such as 100% in Denmark, 23% in Italy, 
and 13% in Germany and France [2]. 
Urban demographic growth and the consequent dramatic lifestyle change are behind the most 
important increases in water demand, most of which is supplied through the exploitation of the 
groundwater sources. For instance, the share of groundwater to potable water in Taiwan has risen from 
21 to 40 percent, in only eight years (from 1983 to 1991) [1]. In addition, the exploitation of 
groundwater for irrigation purposes is also massive, and the growing demand for food will cause an 
increase in demand for water resources. Since it is likely that these trends of water demand will be 
confirmed, a further pressure on groundwater exploitation is also expected and, therefore, a risk of 
depletion for this resource is highly relevant [3]. 
In the past, some important legislative measures have been enacted, such as Directives 76/160/EEC 
(Quality of bathing water), 76/464/EEC (Water pollution by discharges of certain dangerous 
substances), 80/68/CEE (Groundwater protection against dangerous substances), 91/676/EEC (Nitrates 
Directive), 91/271/EEC (Urban Waste Water Treatment). However, the European Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) 2000/60/CE is innovative in the sense that it promotes an integrated and holistic 
water management approach, targeting all water bodies and pursuing a sustainable use of water 
resources, either from a quantitative or a qualitative perspective. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the directive puts a strong emphasis on the concept of economic 
efficiency as in the case of a generic commodity, has alerted the public concern, since it has been 
interpreted as an attempt to transform a public good into a private commodity, that can be sold, 
purchased and subject to economic speculators. This vision neglects the multidimensional role of the 
water resource, which is not only devoted to productive purposes, but is also an indispensable good to 
human needs and to ecological systems [4]. 
At present, there is general difficulty in controlling groundwater extraction for agricultural 
purposes. For instance, in Italy, as in other EU countries, the historical development of water rights can 
be summarized as a progressive establishment of public power over a free-access common property. 
The key characteristics of the Italian water institutions can be summarized as follows [5]: 
(i) sectoriality (water legislation evolved to respond to specific water uses): (ii) fragmentation 
(competences in the water domain are exerted by a large number of different administrations and 
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territorial levels); (iii) emergency driven (advances in the regulatory settings occur when emergencies 
exert pressure on the policymaker); (iv) dominated by supply-side and public-work approaches.  
Consequently, groundwater extraction is basically regulated through non-marketable private 
licenses without clear access rules, nor a specific quantity constraint. Although the drill of private 
wells is subject to public authorization or licensing, in many cases the public authority is incapable of 
(or unwilling to) prohibit illegal or excessive water abstraction. However, under the new legislative 
course promoted by the WFD, the authorities have to enact several measures to achieve the 
quantitative and qualitative goals by 2015. In that sense, the restrictions to water access and extraction 
are likely to be introduced or strengthened in most of European countries [6]. 
At present, the use rights cannot be traded therefore farmers with historical rights will take an 
advantage position for a likely restriction of groundwater use rights. Additionally, a further cause of 
inefficient use relies on the fact that in some countries (e.g., Italy) the exchange of water use rights 
among farmers is not allowed. In this context, this research analyzes economic effects of reforming the 
current framework of use rights for irrigation purpose. In order to investigate on the mentioned aspects, 
in this study a reform of the current framework based on non-tradable use rights is proposed. In this 
regard, two alternative liberalization settings are assumed, by which the groundwater exchange is 
opened and the access rights are re-addressed. With the first hypothesis, farmers are enabled to 
exchange their historical water use rights. Therefore farmers capable of the most (economic) profitable 
use will be interested in the purchase of the resource from other farmers, who will find the opportunity 
to sell their rights, within the entitlements currently assigned by the public authority.  
With the second scenario, it is assumed that the public authority may recall the current use rights, 
and re-distribute them to farmers, through an auction system. Therefore a re-allocation of use rights is 
expected, where the most profitable farms capable of purchasing as much use rights as they need, 
directly from the public authority, at a given price depending on their willingness to pay.  
The motivation of this study is that, although positive economic benefits are generally expected 
from the liberalization process at aggregated level, we want to evaluate whether a win-win effect is 
occurring in all types of farms, or if some differences may emerge. The empirical case-study refers to 
the Fortore river basin, located in the South of Italy, where groundwater is currently over-extracted and 
covers about 50–80% of the current needs, as well as informal (though illegal) water markets across 
neighbor farmers which are already quite common.  
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section reports a short review on groundwater 
concerns. Section 3 reports about the methodology and the data necessary for policy analysis. Results 
are illustrated in Section 4, while same concluding remarks are discussed in the last section. 
2. Key Issues in Groundwater Management 
The fraction of groundwater normally used for irrigation of field crops, mostly derives from water 
flowing through shallow aquifers, and can be considered a renewable natural resource. In several 
countries (e.g., Italy) it is conceived as a public good, which implies the emergence of market failures. 
In order to face the inefficient allocation of water use rights, property rights are often owned by the 
public authority, while the use rights may be entitled to private subjects, through temporary 
authorization or license, for specific private purposes (e.g., irrigation), except commercial uses. In this 
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way, the public authority may exert a direct role on the protection of the resource stock and quality, 
through juridical tools based on the setting of the number of authorized wells and the definition of 
quality standards. While it is evident that this approach is based on the central role of the public 
authority, with the enactment of the WFD, the European Union attempts to introduce economic tools 
(e.g., pricing methods, tradable rights) to transfer the full cost of the water service (including the 
operational cost, resource cost, and externalities) directly to the final user and, therefore, to allocate 
water rights to the most (economic) efficient users. In this way an improvement of water use  
efficiency is expected. 
An extreme attempt to favor an optimal allocation of the resource is through the establishment of 
markets of use rights. In the last decades, several countries have reformed their legislative framework 
to activate some sort of water market. In Chile, Australia and the United States, water markets have 
already been activated for several years [7], while in some other countries the process of reform 
started, but has not been completed yet, such as in the case of Canada [8], Spain [9,10], and  
South Africa [11].  
However, in spite of the growing interest of economists and water management experts towards the 
potential gains achievable from the correct setting of use rights in the water markets, some empirical 
evidence emerges, supporting the fact that there are some risks which should be considered. For 
instance, according to the experience accumulated in Chile during the 15 years since the establishment 
of the market of both temporary and permanent use rights, there is evidence emerging from some 
research that the exchange intensity appears rather different across regions, due to: (i) geographic 
characteristics and types of existing infrastructures; (ii) legal and administrative aspects; (iii) cultural 
factors and psychological attitude of local communities; (iv) prices and water value [12]. In the case of 
Australia, the intensity of the exchange seems affected by the water availability, the prices of the 
substitute products of agricultural commodities, and the fluctuation of prices of irrigated crops [13]. 
The creation of a market of groundwater use rights is subject to some prerequisite, necessary to 
ensure that demand and supply occur within a juridical context where the rights of both parties are 
guaranteed, such as the open access to full information to all possible participants, and the ability of 
the potential participants to participate in the negotiation and the transaction, at accessible cost [12]. 
However, empirical evidence has proved that transaction costs are relevant and may hinder the 
participation of small suppliers and users [14,15]. Some authors consider the exchange of permanent 
use rights, where the water resource may be fully considered as a sort of asset and could be sold 
independently from the farmland and, therefore, it is claimed that a reliable and updated informative 
source provided by the public institutions is needed, in order to protect the owner of use rights, similar 
to the case of the protection of property rights on farmland [12]. 
The change in the legislative framework to allow for the exchange of use rights may be possible and 
also necessary, but this process of reform should be based on the active involvement and participation 
of all stakeholders at community level. Worldwide, several countries have enforced a legislative 
framework to allow water markets. Among the most significant experiences, it is worth mentioning the 
Cile’s 1981 water law, where existing water users were granted of property rights without charge. 
However, the state auctions new property rights which, under certain regulations, can be sold to 
anyone, for any purpose, at free negotiated prices [16]. 
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Another example is Peru’s 1993 constitution, where land and water resources are treated 
equivalently, and thus permits tradable property rights to water. In addition, a draft water law proposes 
that these rights can be traded, leased, or used as collateral. Property rights holders are enabled to get 
property rights free of charge, either implicitly by custom or explicitly through licenses and permits. 
On the contrary, rights for unused water would be auctioned subject to some protections, such as:  
(i) ensuring that the availability of water to others is not reduced; (ii) that there is enough water to 
maintain a minimum ecological flow; and (iii) that people in neighboring towns retain their 
accustomed access [17]. 
In recent years, several states in Australia have established property rights to water, though they 
have initially placed substantial restrictions on intersectoral trading [13]. 
With regard to Europe, in France the reform allowing the exchange of temporary water user rights 
has recently been promoted, with a strong emphasis on the principles of transparency, democracy, and 
solidarity, which reflect the consolidated cultural background of this country. On the contrary, typical 
economic principles, here are less important, but having more importance in countries characterized by 
the anglo-saxon culture [18]. 
3. Simulation of the Legislative Framework Change Referred to the Case Study of the Fortore 
River Basin 
The empirical exercise described below attempts to get a broad understanding of the magnitude of 
economic gains and losses consequent to the reform of the legislative framework on groundwater use 
rights. The exercise consists of comparing the situation before and after the reform. However it is 
worth mentioning that in order to complete an eventual reform on such a sensitive matter, a long 
process of politic discussion and public involvement is necessary, and may also induce legal actions of 
some affected parties against the State. All these aspects obviously will imply some highly relevant 
costs, in terms of time for discussion and voting, as well as private and public costs to cover legal fees 
and trial costs.  
In addition, this analysis is focused only on the current effects on irrigated agriculture, given that in 
the South of Italy, similar to other arid and semi-arid regions, irrigation is the economic activity 
exerting the highest pressure on groundwater sources. Although irrigated agriculture is undoubtedly 
profitable and also plays a strategic role for industrial food chains (e.g., processed tomato, wine, olive 
oil), the need for a sustainable approach is acknowledged, since groundwater extraction affects the 
profitability of neighbor users, the depletion of the resource, and the endowments for  
future generations. 
3.1. Data Collection 
Technical data. The case study refers to a flat area served by irrigation infrastructures of pipelines 
conveying pressured water, managed by the local irrigation board called ‘Consorzio per la Bonifica 
della Capitanata’ (CBC) (see Figure 1). The irrigation project was completed in the 1960s and 
converted traditional rain fed agriculture based on pastures and winter cereals, in more intensive 
agriculture, that was also stimulating the demand for additional water sources. Indeed private wells 
have been largely drilled without strict control from the public authority. Their distribution has been 
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also affected by the water accessibility to the CBC, which still represents the most convenient and  
low-cost water source. For this reason, groundwater is often a complementary source either to enlarge 
the irrigated area, and also to guarantee the availability of irrigation in case of water shortage from the 
CBC, which depends on the rainfall patterns in the autumn and winter [19]. The percentage of water 
from CBC and groundwater from private wells annually varies according to the CBC availability. 
Usually the share amounts to 50% between the two sources, but during exceptionally long drought 
periods the groundwater can reach 100% of irrigation water [19]. 
Figure 1. The study area (Apulia region, Foggia province). The faded area is served by the 
CBC. 
 
Although the overall irrigation infrastructure covers about 135,000 ha, the economic analysis refers 
to a representative area (the District 12) of 11,300 ha, devoted to wheat, tomato for the processing 
industry, and some other horticulture crops (e.g., asparagus, artichoke, cabbage). The yearly amount of 
water conveyed by the CBC amounts to 10 million cubic meters, and an equivalent amount is 
estimated to be extracted from private wells.  
The farming structure consists of 1,198 farms, with the average size ranging from 10 to 43 ha. 
According to a previous study conducted on the same area, five farm typologies can be shaped by 
means of a cluster analysis: (i) small and part-time family farms; (ii) medium size farms with cereals 
and intensive horticultural crops; (iii) large size farms with cereals and intensive horticultural crops;  
(iv) average size farms with cereals, intensive horticultural crops and orchards; and (v) large size 
corporation farm. They mostly differ in terms of crop rotations, intensity of land renting and monthly 
hired and family work load (more details are available in [20]). 
In order to simplify the empirical exercise, we selected only the two main types of farms, 
representing 82% of the operating farms, and 72% of the cultivated land.  
As reported in Table 1, the first type is the common irrigated farm, where irrigated crops play a 
relevant role (tomato and other horticultural crops covering respectively 19% and 21% of the 
farmland). The second type is relatively less intensive, with larger farmland size, and relatively more 
simplified cropping patterns based on rain fed cereals and irrigated tomato.  
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Table 1. Descriptive data of the two farm types. 
 Type 1 (intensive) Type 2 (less intensive) 
Total farmland (ha) 1,686 8,218 
Operating farms (number) 180 805 
Farm size (ha) 22 43 
Share of irrigated land (%) 45 28 
Specific water consumption (m
3
/ha) 1,672 2,579 
Cropping patterns:   
winter cereals (mainly durum wheat) (%) 50 70,00 
tomato for processing industry (%) 19 18 
horticultural crops (%) 21 7 
orchards (olive and vineyard) (%) 10 5 
Source: [20] from original data provided by CBC (Data referred to year 2003). 
Defining the current situation of use rights (status-quo). At present, there are two main water 
irrigation sources: water conveyed by the CBC and groundwater from private wells.  
Although the CBC is a private consortium of landowners, it is empowered by the public authority 
(the Apulia Region) to manage the water from the reservoir called ‘Occhito’, located in the 
mountainous area of the province of Foggia. Landowners have received water use rights by a system 
coupled with their own land, for an overall amount of water rights which is proportional to the land 
served by the infrastructure. The use rights are strictly linked with the land and depend on the presence 
of infrastructures, and cannot be sold separately (neither temporarily, nor permanently). The available 
amount of water supply varies according to the reservoir capacity, which depends on the rainfall 
during the previous year. Consequently, larger landowners take a revenue advantage, which becomes 
evident in terms of higher yields of irrigated crops, or higher market values.  
The CBC adopts volumetric increasing block tariffs, and therefore farmers pay accordingly with 
their actual consumption. In more detail, during the year 2007, a three-tiered pricing has been applied, 
with a first block of 2,050 m
3
/ha at a lower tariff (0.09 EUR/m
3
), sufficient to cover their running 
costs, a second block of 950 m
3
/ha, available at an intermediate tariff (0.12 EUR/m
3
), and the 
exceeding amount at a higher tariff (0.24 EUR/m
3
). This last tariff currently exceeds the water 
productivity of most farms, which is evaluated in terms of 0.18 EUR/m
3
 [20,21]. 
In the case of the management of groundwater, the responsibility is upon the public authority, which 
is empowered to release extraction licenses to legitimated farmers (upon agreement with the 
landowner) for agricultural purposes and for a limited temporal horizon (30 years). However, the 
difficulties of performing an accurate monitoring over a relatively wide, scarcely populated area, has 
also favored the spreading of a high number of illegal drills. Today about 45,000 wells are estimated 
over the overall CBC served area [22]. Furthermore, the public authority has collected data depicting a 
critical status of quality worsening, mostly due to the salinization process caused by the over-
exploitation that have induced the infiltration of sea water [23]. The Apulia Region has enacted the 
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Regional Law n.9, of 21 May 2008, which introduces some changes in the procedure to get a 
groundwater right. Indeed, farmers are required to install measurement devices to record the amount 
extracted, as well as the periodical monitoring of the quality status, in terms of pollutants (e.g., nitrates 
and organic carbon) and salinization indicators. In order to exert an effective control on the volume 
extracted, a fixed allotment for each well has been determined. Furthermore, farmers are obliged to 
transmit data records to the public authority, and in the case of omission the authorization may be 
recalled. Finally, new permits (i.e., access) are banned, until a complete monitoring of the current 
situation will be achieved. In this sense from an economic perspective, an advantage rent position 
arises in favor of farmers benefiting from the current authorization regime. 
According to the current state of the average water consumption for the two farm types in the study 
area, Table 2 reports the water availability either from the CBC and groundwater sources. 
3.2. Specification of Alternative Use Right Settings 
In order to proceed with the scenario formulation, three key factors that emerged from the literature 
analysis have been considered: (i) type of user allowed for participating in the market; (ii) resource 
access type; and (iii) possibility to sell (or re-sell) the use rights. 
Table 2. Current situation of groundwater use rights in the study area. 
Water 
source 
Farm Type 1 (intensive) Farm Type 2 (less intensive) 
Access 
Extraction 
(year 2007) 
Sale Access 
Extraction 
(year 2007) 
Sale 
CBC 
Proportional to 
the served land 
4,800 m
3
 Forbidden 
Proportional to 
the served land 
8,000 m
3
 Forbidden 
Groundwater 
Historical record 
of extraction; 
banning of new 
authorizations 
5,000 m
3
 Forbidden 
Historical record 
of extraction; 
banning of new 
authorizations 
7,500 m
3
 Forbidden 
Source: Adapted from [20]. 
Table 3. Features of use rights scenarios. 
 Access right Extraction right Exchange right 
Status-quo 
Maintenance of the current 
authorized wells. Block of new 
authorizations 
Volumetric allotment corresponding 
to historical records for each farm-
type 
Forbidden 
Intra-sector 
market (A) 
As status-quo As status-quo 
Temporary use right 
exchange allowed only 
among farmers 
Regional 
market (B) 
Free access to groundwater 
also to non-farmers, but 
subject to payment of 
volumetric tariffs 
Overall extracted water at basin 
level, constrained up to historical 
records. Unconstrained use for 
single farmer 
Forbidden 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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As Table 3 shows, the current scenario (status-quo) depicts a situation in which the current users 
maintain their historical rights, while new authorization will not released. Farmer will not face any 
resource cost, except their private cost for water extraction from the ground. Finally, they are not 
allowed to sell water to other users. 
In the case of the Intra-sector Market (A), farmers are allowed to sell their use rights only to other 
farmers. Since we are referring to an agricultural district where intensive farming is limited by water 
availability, the restriction of market participation seems reasonable and necessary to create a climate 
of trust in markets among farmers, which is an indispensable condition to activate the market [24]. We 
assumed the absence of transaction costs, and free and complete information about water availability 
and price. According to the economic theory, the market would allow a more efficient allocation 
towards users capable of achieving higher groundwater productivity, with a consequent increase of 
agricultural wealth and farmers’ revenue. 
In order to consider the opportunity to allow non-farmers groundwater access, we considered the 
Regional Market (B) scenario, where the public authority acts as a third party mediating agent, in order 
to prevent speculative actions and uneven access to the market. In this case, each participant may 
purchase use rights, regardless of the historical record. The public authority launches bidding calls at 
some determined level of pricing, to which farmers and non-farmers may participate. The level of the 
bid may also be conceived in terms of opportunity cost for water diversion for environmental uses, 
where the public authority acts to preserve the depletion of natural resources. Obviously, this scenario 
implies higher costs for farmers, but the removal of the historical constraints may allow the most 
efficient farmers to enlarge their irrigation operations, with a consequent increase in overall 
agricultural wealth and farmer’s income as well.  
3.3. Economic Modeling 
A mathematical programming model has been applied in order to simulate farmers’ decision 
making process under different groundwater use right settings. This kind of model is very frequent in 
the case of water allocation problems, due to the large heterogeneity of study areas, as well as the lack 
of data (either time series or cross sections) needed to adopt econometric models. In our case, we 
adopted a multi-agent territorial model, to simultaneously maximize the net return of the two types of 
farms, which are competing for the water resource available at basin level. Similar models have largely 
been reported in the scientific literature [25,26], and have also been applied to the Fortore river  
basin [20,27,28]. The most remarkable difference with previous models consists of the fact that instead 
of calculating the aggregated farms’ revenue at basin level as the maximum sum of each farm’s 
revenue multiplied by the number of operating farms (Max NR = η Σ (Farm’s revenue); in this case 
farm revenue is maximized for each farm type, and then we proceed with the weighted sum  
(Σ η NR = (Farms’s revenue)). In our opinion, this approach seems more logically consistent with what 
actually happens in the real world, where farmers interact with each other at single level, rather than at 
aggregated level. Consequently, the regional model specification of a farm pursuing its revenue 
maximization (NR) under the current situation (status-quo), is formally described by the following: 
Σ η Max NR ={Σ x [q p – Σ ( c v ) – Σ Σ (a v
w
 )–mls ] – Wc –Fix +SFP } (1) 
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s.t.: 
η Σ (x t ) ≤ T: land use availability of farm type j, for each season s is a constraint for the cultivation 
of the crop x; 
η Σ (x Σ a ) ≤ W: irrigation water needs, depending on the specific water consumption a (m
3
/ha) of 
crop i, is constrained by the water availability W, deriving from source b, and available for farm type j; 
η Σ (x l ) ≤ L: work load of type c (hours) needed by the crop i during the season s, is constrained by 
t the total labour availability L. 
where: 
η : weight representing the number of farm type j; 
x : size of farmland (ha) devoted to the cultivation of the crop i, by farm type j; 
t : seasonal farmland use (ha per season s), needed by the crop i, during season s; 
T : farmland availability (ha), for season s and farm type j; 
q , p : yields (t) and prices (EUR), of crop i;  
mls : vector of production costs differences across farm types, due to economies of scale and 
different access to CAP subsidies, for crop i and farm type j (EUR/ha); 
c , v : technical coefficients of input z (kg/ha), and its market price (EUR/kg); 
a v
w
 : specific water consumption for crop i, deriving for source b, and its tariff; 
Fix : fixed costs faced by farm type j (EUR/farm), including insurance, maintenance, overheads, 
and taxes; 
SFP : single farm payment, related to the EU CAP (EUR/farm); 
WC : irrigation fixed cost, referred to farm type j (EUR).  
In order to simulate the intra-sectoral market (A) the model has been modified by introducing a 
variable representing the exchanged water from one farm type to the other (w and w), leading to the 
equation (η Σ (x Σ a) ≤ w − w + W), provided that w and w can be positive or negative, but  
w − w = 0. This implies that farmers agree to a negotiated price (v
w’
), which determines a cost to farms 
purchasing water (v
w’
w) or a revenue to selling one (+v
w’
w). The mathematical model will calculate the 
best water allocation, by allowing a transaction of water rights from the farm type characterized by 
lower water productivity, to those having higher values. The conditions for water rights exchange will 
disappear when the values for water productivity of both farms will equalize: λw = λw = = λw for each 
n belonging to j. In this case, W may be conceived as the quota determined by the regulatory authority, 
in order to reduce the amount of water allocated to farmers, and therefore to save water for  
alternative uses. 
With regard to the simulation of regional market (B), we eliminated the constraints representing the 
historical water uses (Σ (x Σ a ) ≤ W) from the status-quo model, and we substituted it with a more 
relaxed constraint (η Σ (x Σ a ) ≤ W). In addition, based on the assumption that the public authority acts 
as a third party mediating agent, it is supposed to start a bidding session, by defining a water tariff so 
that to clear the market or, alternatively, at a relatively higher tariff and that some water volumes are 
still available to be diverted to non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, the water tariff is conceived as a 
sort of resource cost corresponding to its opportunity cost (v
w
 = v
w
 + res_cost). The equilibrium 
reached by the optimal solution will equalize the water productivity for every farm type j, with the 
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resource cost (λjwj=res_cost). Also in this case, the regulatory authority may reduce the quota allocated 
to irrigation W, in order to save water for environmental purposes, coherently with the  
WFD objectives. 
Some more common model assumptions are described as follows. First of all, both types of farmers 
are assumed to pursue the net revenue, but differ in terms of the fixed endowment of production 
factors (land, labor, and capital). Secondly, we adopted a linear fixed coefficient production function, 
since the arid climate and the scarcity of rainfall during the cropping season force farmers to adopt the 
most common irrigation system on main profitable crops (tomato and horticultural crops). Indeed, 
localized drop irrigation is the largest irrigation system. In addition, technical coefficients, yields, 
prices, and other economic data are referred to years 2007–2008. The costs for production factors 
provided by the farming family are evaluated in terms of opportunity cost. The exchange of water use 
rights occur in absence of transaction costs, and a condition of complete information of exchanged 
volumes and prices. We forced this assumption due to the lack of estimations. Finally, we assumed that 
in order to calibrate the model, the cropping patterns of the status-quo scenario should correspond with 
the real data. Due to the lack of statistical data on groundwater extraction, we estimated a difference 
from the overall water needed by the irrigate crops and the water conveyed by the CBC. 
4. Results 
In this section we report the main findings derived from the comparison of the two alternative water 
use right settings (A) and (B), with the status-quo scenario. First of all, we analyze the performances of 
the two farm types, in order to evaluate their ability to adapt to the legislative change. Secondly, we 
run the model to obtain the aggregated results at basin level, in order to get a broad overview of the 
impact of the reform on the irrigated agriculture. 
4.1. Farm Level Analysis 
When we proceed with the farm level analysis, the farmer’s objective to maximize net revenue is 
assumed. Additionally, amounts of water either from CBC and groundwater as well as their marginal 
productivity are assessed. In Table 4 the results in the case of the status-quo are shown. 
Table 4. Overview of farm performances, under the status-quo scenario. 
 T1 T2 
Water marginal productivity (EUR/m
3
) 0.1726 0.1484 
Farm revenue (EUR/farm) 15,841 14,683 
Water consumption (m
3
/year)  
CBC 4,584 7,985 
Groundwater 5,085 7,650 
Notes: T1 = Type 1 farms (intensive); T2 = Type 2 farms (less intensive), Source: own elaboration. 
The absolute values of water marginal productivity in the status-quo scenario are different for each 
farm type and, in both cases they are higher than the private cost for groundwater extraction assumed 
to be equal to 0.09 EUR/m
3
. Under the no-constraints assumption, the groundwater demand for both 
farms will rise. Put in another way, it means that both firms would be better off pumping some 
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additional groundwater. As a consequence, measures to limit groundwater extraction, in order to avoid 
its over-exploitation, are needed. Indeed, under the status-quo, the public authority have limited the 
groundwater abstraction by an allotment quota system, and ceased the release of new access licenses to 
the resource. 
The absolute values of water marginal productivity are not equal. Differences may arise in the 
structural endowment factors, as well as in the different sets of possible crops, affecting the whole 
farm management. Under this situation, the opportunity for farms type T1 of purchasing additional 
water from farm type T2 clearly emerges. The exchange price will be defined through a negotiation 
process within the range 0.1484–0.1726 EUR/m
3
.  
Afterward, the market scenario (A) which enables the exchange of the groundwater resource 
between the two farm types is implemented. Farmers also exchange groundwater use rights, provided 
they respect their initial allowance. In this way they can sell a maximum of groundwater volume, 
which reflects their historical allotments. As Table 5 shows, as far as farm type T1 purchases water, its 
marginal productivity decreases whereas its farm income increases. On the contrary, as long as farm 
type T2 sells water, its marginal productivity increases, as well as its farm income. Once the marginal 
productivity is the same, the exchanged volume amounts to 2,237 m
3
 and then the equilibrium is 
reached. In terms of farm revenue, both farmers gain from the market. 
Table 5. Farms’ performances under the intra-sector market scenario. 
Exchanged  
water (m
3
) 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Marginal productivity (EUR/m
3
) Farm revenue (EUR/farm) Groundwater use (m
3
) 
0 0.1726 0.1484 15,841 14,683 5,085 7,650 
1,442 0.1726 0.1484 15,857 14,703 6,527 6,208 
2,000 0.1726 0.1612 15,864 14,704 7,085 5,650 
2,237 0.1613 0.1613 15,866 14,705 7,322 5,413 
Notes: T1 = Type 1 farms (intensive); T2 = Type 2 farms (less intensive), Source: own elaboration. 
Although the figures related to gains in farm revenue appear relatively small, it is important to 
remark that the amount of exchanged water is very significant, equivalent to 44 percent of the initial 
endowment for farm type T1, and 29 percent for farm type T2. It should be reminded that the buyer 
has to purchase groundwater at a price ranging from 0.1484–0.1726 EUR/m
3
, which already includes 
the extraction cost of 0.09 EUR/m
3
. In addition, the small magnitude of farm revenue may depend on 
the other structural constraints (e.g., family and hired labor availability), which determine additional 
financial costs reducing the water profitability at a lower level than expected. On the other hand, the 
seller receives money for water. However, he reduces irrigated crops on the farm which are most 
profitable with respect to the rain fed.  
Now we turn to the case of the regional market scenario (B) where the removal of historical 
entitlements is applied. The access of groundwater resource under this hypothesis is liberalized and the 
authority creates a market devoted to water use rights auctions, which is opened to farmers. A 
maximum groundwater abstraction is only imposed at aggregated level given that each farmer can buy 
water depending on market price and marginal productivity. Nevertheless, since the access to 
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groundwater use rights is open, it is expected that the farm type with the highest groundwater 
productivity will obtain the largest amount of water rights.  
As Table 6 shows, it is worth noticing that farm type T1 finds it economically profitable to purchase 
higher water volumes with respect to the status-quo scenario. On the contrary, farm type T2 demands a 
lower volume of water. This different behavior has some relevant impacts on farm income. Indeed the 
farm type T1 gains from this scenario while the farm type T2 faces some loss. The difference of 
impacts becomes more evident as the public authority raises the resource tariff, from 0.03 EUR/m
3
, to 
0.09 EUR/m
3
. This different effect can be explained in terms of the higher marginal productivity of the 
farm T1, as seen in the case of status-quo scenario. Although water marginal productivity decreases 
and the resource fee increases, water consumption remains unchanged whereas a decrease in farm 
revenue is found. This effect can be explained by the inelastic water demand faced by farms operating 
in arid and semi-arid environments [21,29,30]. 
Table 6. Farms’ performances under the Regional market (B) scenario. 
Resource fees 
(EUR/m
3
) 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Marginal productivity 
(EUR/m
3
) 
Farm revenue (EUR/farm) Groundwater use (m
3
) 
0 0.1623 0.1623 16,227 14,342 7,322 5,413 
0.03 0.1334 0.1334 15,991 14,167 7,322 5,413 
0.09 0.0613 0.0613 15,519 13,818 7,322 5,413 
Notes: T1 = Type 1 farms (intensive); T2 = Type 2 farms (less intensive), Source: own elaboration. 
This aspect may hinder the process of farm adaptation to the liberalization of groundwater access 
and the application of a resource fee by the public authority. Consequently, some farmers may be 
worse-off and will probably be hostile to the reform. 
4.2. Basin Level Analysis 
In relation to the analysis at basin level, the comparison of the aggregated effect shown on Table 7 
proves that by activating a market of water use rights some gains are achievable, in terms of value 
added. The market scenarios implemented here reach higher values for society welfare, but a reduction 
in overall water consumption does not occur. In that sense, in order to effectively save the groundwater 
resource, public authorities should apply some sort of constraint on water use (i.e., quota allowance) or 
in the case of the regional market, a resource tariff that overcomes water marginal productivity.  
By analyzing the capacity of producing the wealth per unit of consumed water, the positive role of 
activating markets becomes more evident. Indeed, the ratio shows increasing values for both market 
settings with respect to the status-quo scenario. 
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Table 7. Overall effects of legislative framework change at basin level. 
 V.A. 
(10
6
 EUR) 
Water use 
(10
6
 m
3
) 
V.A./Water 
(EUR/m
3
) 
Farm revenue change 
 T1 T2 
Status quo 17.02 17.85 0.95 - - 
Intra-sector market* 18.27 17.04 1.07 +0.10% +0.13% 
Regional market** 18.54 17.16 1.08 +0.95% −3.51% 
Source: own elaboration. 
Notes: (*) Amount of exchange water of 1,442 m
3
/farm. (**) It is considered a resource fee of 0.03 
EUR/m
3
. The abbreviation for V.A. means “value added”. T1 = Type 1 farms (intensive); T2 = 
Type 2 farms (less intensive). 
Finally, the analysis of farms’ revenue shows that the intra-sector market will be more acceptable, 
since there are positive effects in terms of revenue on both farm types. On the contrary, the regional 
market causes some uneven effects, as farm type T1 gains while farm type T2 loses. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In recent decades, public concern about the creation of water markets to allow for the exchange of 
water use rights has also been raised in the interest of economists towards the potential gains either at 
individual or aggregated levels. Markets would likely enable the most efficient firms to make a better 
use of the resource, which could also attract private investors with the large investments needed to 
increase the supply of water resources.  
However, theoretical frameworks considering the determinants for achieving a truly efficient use of 
the water resource remain insufficient due to some relevant issues, such as the role of transaction costs 
and information availability to market participants, which are still not well implemented in economic 
analyses. Furthermore, empirical studies are still scarce to grasp the real extent of possible gains which 
could be expected from the creation of an efficient market. 
In addition, it should be emphasized that a monetary measure of the gains consequent to the 
legislative reform of property rights setting, is not suitable to evaluate the multifaceted functions 
exerted by the water resource in human society, to satisfy basic biological and health needs, and to 
guarantee ecological functions. 
 In this regard, in the recent conclusions at the 5th World Forum it is stated that water access is a 
basic need and that water policy should promote rules to guarantee a fair allocation among users, in 
order to also ensure access to weak social groups [31]. However, at the moment, due to lack of 
information on demand curves referring to different water uses in the area, modeling of the whole 
social gains derived from the diversion of water from irrigation purposes to other sectors (potable, 
industry, environment, and amenities) is not feasible. 
According to the experience reported in this paper, we found some evidence that possible gains may 
be obtained by reforming the current legal framework regulating water use rights. However, the 
magnitude of the effects, as well as the fact that under certain conditions some user groups may lose, 
demonstrates that further analysis is needed and that these results may represent a support to policy 
makers and stakeholders involved in the reforming process. 
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